Ah, Michael Rubin at the American Enterprise Institute (along with Dan Blumenthal and Newt Gringrich) might not drink "Foggy Bottom Kool-Aid" but again the Churchill reference makes you wonder what "Churchill" they've created in their minds. Of course, it's not clear eaxactly what they believe the "Churchillian" response would-be, in North Korea, Iran or Iraq, but they sure love to talk tough. To each other.
"The North Korean nuclear test is significant for two reasons. First, it has stripped any plausibility to arguments that engaging dictators works. Our failure was bipartisan. Clinton’s strategy was ill-conceived, but when push came to shove, the Bush White House drank the same Foggy Bottom Kool-Aid. Second, we are at a watershed. We know our opponents’ playbook. Will we think several steps ahead? Or embrace short-term illusion? This crisis is not just about North Korea, but about Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba as well. Bush now has two choices: to respond forcefully and show that defiance has consequence, or affirm that defiance pays and that international will is illusionary. Diplomats crave wiggle room, but it has just run out. Multilateralism is like Diet Coke; it may taste good, but it lacks substance. Conversations with foreign leaders aren’t enough if they do not produce results. Nor should consultation or declaration substitute for results. Bush must now choose whether his legacy will be one of inaction or leadership, Chamberlain or Churchill?"
Getting Testy
A Symposium on Pyonyang Policy
By Dan Blumenthal, Michael Rubin, Newt Gingrich
Posted: Tuesday, October 10, 2006
ARTICLES
National Review Online
Publication Date: October 10, 2006
Wednesday, October 11, 2006
Monday, October 09, 2006
Ah, the "Iraq Study Group" or as it's also known, "Those Who Seek A Way Out of Folly" and "Drifting Sideways? Give Em Merlot"
James Baker III, William Perry, Rudolph Giuliani, Sandra Day O'Connor, Vernon Jordan are all charged with figuring out how to maintain a US presence ("stay the course") and begin the withdraw ("cut and run"). Yes, according to a New York Times report today, it seems clear that a planned extraction of the US from Iraq is being developed by Baker and friends. This as last week the NYT reported that the US military is beginning to develop a counter-insurgency program especially focused on Iraq, and that the Rumsfeld mandate of reducing the size of the military is being reversed to address the reality of a two-front (at least) war. Late, but possibly not too late. Meanwhile, sacntions against new nuclear-player North Korea? Why? Anyone with the "balls" to pressure China to reign in their naughty neighbor? Seems the scorecard on US versus the Axis of Evil is not in our favor. How about talking and an effective use of force? Appears Mr. Baker is going to suggest to the American Colossus that he talk with Iran and Syria. Maybe Mr. John Yoo should take a break from his abstract, theoretical world of ever-increasing executive power and see what happens when the American Colossus is not as important or as "real" as his advisors. Instead of increasing the range of the executive branch, we should take a "real-world" lesson form the last six years and make sure the other two branches--legislative and judicial--have the nerve and the law to stand-up to an executive branch talking to Yahweh.
Wednesday, October 04, 2006
And Then There's That Pesky Colossus On The Koren Peninsula
This from the Brookings Institution.
Wrong on North KoreaAmerica Abroad Weblog, July 13, 2006 cont occurs here -->Ivo H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
"As for isolation leading to the North's collapse, the problem is that whether to isolate the North or not is a matter for Seoul and Beijing to decide, not Washington. There's little more we can do to isolate the North; we're all sanctioned out. But there's plenty Pyongyang's neighbors can do to life there even more unbearable. Yet, while we may see the collapse of an evil regime like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an unquestioned blessing, neighboring countries that will have to live the consequences of its implosion have a decidedly different view of the matter. They don't want to be responsible for the destitute millions that would come streaming across their borders - or have to provide the hundreds of billions of dollars necessary to turn things around in the North. Instead, their number one priority is to avoid the chaos that comes from collapse and disintegration - which is why basing a policy on the hope that China and the ROK will help bring about the North's collapse is so naïve and wrong-headed. "
Wrong on North KoreaAmerica Abroad Weblog, July 13, 2006 cont occurs here -->Ivo H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
"As for isolation leading to the North's collapse, the problem is that whether to isolate the North or not is a matter for Seoul and Beijing to decide, not Washington. There's little more we can do to isolate the North; we're all sanctioned out. But there's plenty Pyongyang's neighbors can do to life there even more unbearable. Yet, while we may see the collapse of an evil regime like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an unquestioned blessing, neighboring countries that will have to live the consequences of its implosion have a decidedly different view of the matter. They don't want to be responsible for the destitute millions that would come streaming across their borders - or have to provide the hundreds of billions of dollars necessary to turn things around in the North. Instead, their number one priority is to avoid the chaos that comes from collapse and disintegration - which is why basing a policy on the hope that China and the ROK will help bring about the North's collapse is so naïve and wrong-headed. "
Maybe Kristol Just Needs Pairing With Someone Serious, But Here's Some Sound Advice for the American Colossus
The Consensus for a Larger Army Is about as Complete as It Could Be
By Frederick W. Kagan, William Kristol
Posted: Monday, September 25, 2006
ARTICLES
The Weekly Standard
Publication Date: October 2, 2006
"Now, the fact is that there are more troops available to be sent to Iraq. But we also are stretched too thin, and need a larger military. In a front-page article on September 22, the New York Times's Thom Shanker and Michael Gordon reported that "strains on the Army from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have become so severe that Army officials say they may be forced to make greater use of the National Guard to provide enough troops for overseas deployments." This prospect "presents the Bush administration with a politically vexing problem: how, without expanding the Army, to balance the pressing need for troops in the field against promises to limit overseas deployments for the Guard." Actually, this "vexing problem" has a solution: expanding the Army.
Analysts outside the government are increasingly in agreement: Researchers at conservative think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation call for larger ground forces, as do thinkers at centrist and liberal organizations like Brookings, CSIS, and even the Center for American Progress. The more modest recommendations call for increasing the Army, over the next few years, by 50,000 to 100,000 new troops from its current 500,000. We would urge an immediate expansion toward a 750,000-person Army. In any case, the consensus for a larger Army is about as complete as it could be. Except within the administration.
What's preoccupying the Defense Department, even the top brass at the Army like Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker, is the Future Combat System--the Army's major "transformational" weapons system. Schoomaker has said that he would even cut the number of soldiers in uniform to pay for the system. The key premise of this argument is that Iraq is a blip, and the strain on our ground forces a temporary problem, while the FCS will ensure the Army's superiority for decades to come. But the armed forces have been strained for almost a decade now. And is Iraq really a "blip"? Most of the wars in the last 15 years have led to protracted deployments (the first Iraq war, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, for example). Only Haiti and Somalia--two signal failures--allowed a rapid exit.
The military should not be forced to choose between modernization and manpower. Army and Marine Corps vehicles are more than 20 years old and burned out by years of hard use. They need to be replaced. The president keeps saying that we are a nation at war, but the military keeps having to make budget decisions as though we were at peace. If this trend continues, we could lose in Iraq and break the ground forces as well.
The strain on the soldiers and Marines must be eased. Recruiting and training takes time, of course, and many will argue that it is too late: We'll be out of Iraq before they take the field. That same argument was made in 2003, 2001, 1999, and 1997. If we'd started at any of those times to increase the size of the ground forces, new soldiers would be on the ground today where they are badly needed. How many times are we going to repeat this mistake? How long will it take this administration, properly committed to a robust foreign policy, to provide the tools needed to do the job?"
Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at AEI. William Kristol is editor of The Weekly Standard."
By Frederick W. Kagan, William Kristol
Posted: Monday, September 25, 2006
ARTICLES
The Weekly Standard
Publication Date: October 2, 2006
"Now, the fact is that there are more troops available to be sent to Iraq. But we also are stretched too thin, and need a larger military. In a front-page article on September 22, the New York Times's Thom Shanker and Michael Gordon reported that "strains on the Army from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have become so severe that Army officials say they may be forced to make greater use of the National Guard to provide enough troops for overseas deployments." This prospect "presents the Bush administration with a politically vexing problem: how, without expanding the Army, to balance the pressing need for troops in the field against promises to limit overseas deployments for the Guard." Actually, this "vexing problem" has a solution: expanding the Army.
Analysts outside the government are increasingly in agreement: Researchers at conservative think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation call for larger ground forces, as do thinkers at centrist and liberal organizations like Brookings, CSIS, and even the Center for American Progress. The more modest recommendations call for increasing the Army, over the next few years, by 50,000 to 100,000 new troops from its current 500,000. We would urge an immediate expansion toward a 750,000-person Army. In any case, the consensus for a larger Army is about as complete as it could be. Except within the administration.
What's preoccupying the Defense Department, even the top brass at the Army like Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker, is the Future Combat System--the Army's major "transformational" weapons system. Schoomaker has said that he would even cut the number of soldiers in uniform to pay for the system. The key premise of this argument is that Iraq is a blip, and the strain on our ground forces a temporary problem, while the FCS will ensure the Army's superiority for decades to come. But the armed forces have been strained for almost a decade now. And is Iraq really a "blip"? Most of the wars in the last 15 years have led to protracted deployments (the first Iraq war, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, for example). Only Haiti and Somalia--two signal failures--allowed a rapid exit.
The military should not be forced to choose between modernization and manpower. Army and Marine Corps vehicles are more than 20 years old and burned out by years of hard use. They need to be replaced. The president keeps saying that we are a nation at war, but the military keeps having to make budget decisions as though we were at peace. If this trend continues, we could lose in Iraq and break the ground forces as well.
The strain on the soldiers and Marines must be eased. Recruiting and training takes time, of course, and many will argue that it is too late: We'll be out of Iraq before they take the field. That same argument was made in 2003, 2001, 1999, and 1997. If we'd started at any of those times to increase the size of the ground forces, new soldiers would be on the ground today where they are badly needed. How many times are we going to repeat this mistake? How long will it take this administration, properly committed to a robust foreign policy, to provide the tools needed to do the job?"
Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at AEI. William Kristol is editor of The Weekly Standard."
Sunday, October 01, 2006
Sunday Morning with Cioran and Petronius
"One should not forget that philosophy is the art of masking inner torments." E.M. Cioran
Well, and maybe, food: " . . . the servants made a lane, and a calf was brought in on a two-hundred pound plate: it was boiled whole and wearing a helmet. Following it came Ajax, slashing at the calf with a drawn sword like a madman. After rhymically cutting and slicing, he collected the pieces on the point and shred them among the surprised guests." Petronius
And the madness of Ajax? He's slaughtering cattle he believes to be fellow Greeks who have wronged him. Ah, Greek tragedy--the art of unmasking inner torments and letting them breathe; of course, with some Moet on a fine Sunday morning.
Yours Truly,
Mr. Pantagruel
Well, and maybe, food: " . . . the servants made a lane, and a calf was brought in on a two-hundred pound plate: it was boiled whole and wearing a helmet. Following it came Ajax, slashing at the calf with a drawn sword like a madman. After rhymically cutting and slicing, he collected the pieces on the point and shred them among the surprised guests." Petronius
And the madness of Ajax? He's slaughtering cattle he believes to be fellow Greeks who have wronged him. Ah, Greek tragedy--the art of unmasking inner torments and letting them breathe; of course, with some Moet on a fine Sunday morning.
Yours Truly,
Mr. Pantagruel
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